Motivation
• Shiller, Boycko, and Korobov (AER, 1991):
-Attitudes towards free markets in 1990: NY vs. Moscow -Soviets were not more concerned about the fairness of free market prices and the possibility of a substantial rise in inequality as a result of free markets than Americans -even stronger appreciation of the importance of economic incentives
• Whether and how have attitudes towards free markets evolved in Russia since the beginning of the transition?
• Are Russians satisfied with transition and just as hopeful of free markets as they used to be in 1990?
• What accounts for the evolution of attitudes towards markets? .7
.8
Fraction of people with preference for market economy . 1 is "completely distrust", 2 is "rather distrust", 3 is "neither trust nor distrust", 4 is "rather trust", and 5 is "completely trust" 1 is "completely distrust", 2 is "rather distrust", 3 is "neither trust nor distrust", 4 is "rather trust", and 5 is "completely trust"
On the scale from 1 to 5
16
Evidence which requires explanation 
Aghion et al. (2009): The Model (2)
19 -Solved by backward induction -Two equilibria:
• "Good" equilibrium: mass civicness, no regulation, no externalities, maximum level of production • "Bad" equilibrium: mass uncivicness, regulation, neg.
externalities, relatively low level of production, high degree of corruption -Only the most productive entrepreneurs can enter (only they can afford to pay the bribes) -The society would be worse off if all uncivic (also those who are less productive) would enter, because of more overall negative externalities ⇒Preference for more regulation, even though the regulators are corrupt! Government is bad, business is worse 
